Philosophy of Action:What is the Source of Skepticism about Weakness of Will? How Could a Person’s Desire Lead her to go Against her Better Judgment?

Introduction:

How could a person’s desires lead them to do something other than what they had judged best? One can have the intention to complete an action, but somehow their desires lead them away from their better judgment. To adequately figure this out, a few things need to be considered. First, the role of desires, specifically the compulsive (irresistible) desires and their impact on agents. This paper will explore the concepts of irresistible desires by looking at Alfred Mele’s account in “Irresistible Desires,” while also looking at a contradicting account by Wright Neely presented in his piece titled “Freedom and Desire.” Next, the self-control of an individual and whether having or not having self-control can impact a person’s desires to lead them to do something other than what they have judged best. This paper will be delving into what it means to have no self-control, performing incontinent actions, whether that constituted the individual as being weak-willed, and the role of motivations in making decisions. This will be done by considering another count by Alfred Mele within his piece titled “’Akrasia,’ Reasons, and Causes,” as well as Gary Watson’s account within his piece titled “Skepticism about Weakness of Will.” The concept of weakness of will has been a continuous debate and questioned through many philosophers. More specifically Watson presents two accounts of skepticism on the weakness of will in his piece, but for the purposes of this paper I will only be considering one of the accounts. The form of skepticism to be used is one that admits it possibility on weakness, but casts doubts “upon a complex of distinctions and moral attitudes” within the generic view (Watson 1977, 684). After delving into these topics and the accounts presented by each philosopher, this paper will argue that irresistible desires are not always irresistible, and the common accounts and the ones held by most, tend to get them wrong. This paper will show that what leads a person’s desires to do something other than what they have judged best is to a lack of self-control, essentially being a weak-willed person. It is not the strength of a desire but having a lack of control.

Compulsive (Irresistible) Desires:

If we consider that it was in fact the desire that controlled the agent to go against what they judged best, we need to present accounts that deem desires so powerful that they cannot be resisted. When an agent sets out to perform an action it is typically explained in relation to his beliefs and desires (Neely 1974, 32). A person can have a strong desire to complete an action, but somehow still fail, even with the desire to do it. Even if this person is free, how were they not able to fulfill their desires? This leads to the idea presented by Neely, how freedom is not just what one has a desire to do, there are instances of one being enslaved to their desires, a victim of it even, it’s the idea of a desire being irresistible, making one’s freedom restricted (Neely 1974, 37). Neely’s account holds that a desire is irresistible if and only if the “agent has been presented with what he took to be good and sufficient reason for not acting on it, he would still have acted on it” (Neely 1974, 47).

Now, Mele holds that Neely’s account is incorrect and does not appropriately fit the ideas of irresistible desire (Mele 1990, 455). This is because Mele believes that when we pose the question of whether a desire is irresistible, we are asking whether that person’s desire could have been resisted by them. Mele highlights three problems with Neely’s account. First Mele states, “the subjunctive conditions open” Neely’s account to basic counter examples (Mele 1990, 456). Second, Neely’s analysis entails that the desires which motivate a “central species of incontinent action are irresistible” (Mele 1990, 456). Mele has trouble with this since he believes that incontinent agents are completely different than those who are victims of irresistible desires. Lastly, Mele states that even in extreme cases that one may have a phobia or addiction, it can be imagined that there is some reason that the agent has for not acting as he did, or he would not have acted in that manner. These problems lead Mele to begin developing an account on irresistible desire by first considering circumstances. He believes that it is important to distinguish between ordinary and exceptional circumstances (Mele 1990, 457). For Mele’s account, he is mainly concerned with the circumstances under which the desire became irresistible, whether it was an ordinary or an exceptional circumstance (Mele 1990, 457). Under his account, a desire is considered “irresistible if and only if it is both unconquerable and uncircumventable” (Mele 1990, 467). Meaning, for the desire to be truly irresistible, it must not be comparable, and it cannot be conquered. These desires essentially make one go against their better judgment and allow for weakness of will.

Self-Control:

Akrasia:

Another possible reason as to why a person’s desire can lead them to do something other than what they judged best has to do with self-control, more like the lack of known as akrasia. The idea of akrasia comes from having no self-control, and the opposite, having self-control is known as enkrateia (Mele 1983, 360). Weakness is typically the opposite of strong, and it can be exhibited when one fails to intend, and act in align with an “all things considered judgment;” essentially a judgment that is conditional in practice (Mele 1983, 348). Like akrasia, which is not essentially an action, as explained by Mele, rather it’s a “condition of a person which may be manifested in action (Mele 1983, 360). In a sense it’s the absence of self-control. The type of Akrasia Mele is most concerned with is last stitch akrasia, so after the intention is formed. It is when an agent fails to carry out their intention which they think is best to do (Mele 1983, 364).

         Within his paper, Mele uses the example of a biology student as the groundwork of whether people’s actions are akratic (Mele 1983, 349). A student must complete an assignment requires him to draw his blood by pricking his finger and examining it to determine his blood type. The student does not mind the sight of blood but is hesitant to draw his blood on his own. The student considers his reasoning of completing this assignment and not completing it and judges that, all things considered, he should complete the assignment by drawing his own blood. His reasoning continues, his judgment is that pricking his finger is unconditionally the best option. Now as he is pricking his finger, before the needle touches the skin with the intention to draw blood, the student stops, it seems that this assignment was harder to do than he thought. The student decides to try again by not looking at the needles contact with his finger. But the same thing happens again, the moment the needle contacts his finger, the student stops. Mele points out that this doesn’t essentially mean that he psychologically can’t complete the assignment. Mele states that it seems that the failure presented by the student is to weakness (akrasia). This is because the student is presenting weak tendencies by not doing “what he judges to be best, all things considered and when he intends to do” (Mele 1983, 3490. Mele’s account can be a strong, possible explanation as to why a person’s desire can lead them to do something other than what they thought judged best.

Weakness of Will:

         The topic of weakness of will and relation to self-control should be explored further. Another account to consider is Watson. He holds that self-control is a virtue that an agent can have to ignore the motivation that goes against one’s better judgment (Watson 1977, 692). Watson holds that self-control is a virtue that an agent can have to ignore the motivation that goes against one’s better judgment (Watson 1977, 692). This is the virtue that most agents deemed ‘weak,’ it a lack or failure to exercise in a sense. He presents a case of an individual who has self-control but fails to act on it. Consider a woman who is intentionally drinking a cup of alcohol, and we suppose that when she is done with the first cup, she will have another cup (Watson 1977, 693). There are essentially three descriptions one can assess when looking at this example. First, the reckless and self-indulgent case; the women drinking has knowledge on what she is doing and accepts the consequences. She is faced with only two choices either to get drunk or risk getting drunk. Therefore, she is acting in align with her judgment. Next, is the weak case, meaning the women is consciously taking the drink against her better judgement. The lack of self-better judgment can be explained as Watson states a lack of self-control; hence, she is weak willed. Lastly, the compulsive case, the women is taking the drink knowing it is against her better judgment, but she is a victim of a compulsive (irresistible) desire to drink (Watson 1977, 694). Watson points out that these three descriptions all carry a common feature in the generic conception of weakness. On this model, the weak drinker is extremely like the compulsive drinker as they both are acting in contradiction to better judgment, but at the same time she can resist the drink like the reckless drinker. But, since she acted opposite of her better judgment, she isn’t necessarily like the reckless drinker, more likely just not morally good. Similarly, unlike the compulsive case, the women is not a victim of irresistible desires, she could resist, hence why we can hold her responsible. So, the common account holds that the weak person does in fact have self-control, but fails to act on it (Watson 1977, 694).

         Weakness of will is not just any type of action an agent does that goes against their better judgment (Watson 1977, 697). Watson points out that weakness is a case of compulsion. He states, that if a sufficient condition of compulsive motivation is that the motivation might be contradicting to the agent’s realistic judgment, then the weakness of will is a category of compulsion (Watson 1977, 698). And if we consider that compulsive behavior is involuntary and unfree, then so is weak behavior. In a sense they are the same (Watson 1977, 699). Now a way to argue in a sense to avoid this conclusion, would be to support Joel Fienberg’s notion on irresistible desires. Watson presents Feinberg’s account to showcase the notion that no actions are compulsive, since there is no desire that is irresistible. Feinberg holds that when concerning irresistible desires, there is a founded ambiguity within the strength of the desire (Watson 1977, 699). But Feinberg’s account troubles Watson since it can be seen unjustified to state that there is no such desire that one cannot resist. What distinguishes a self-controlled person to a weak person is the capacity to resist a desire. A self-controlled person and a weak person can both be exposed to the exact same desire with the same amount of strength, but what truly distinguishes them is the idea that the self-controlled person will be able to overcome the desire, whereas the weak individual will not be able to resist.

Watson’s proposed account states that that the desires of weak agents are resistible only in the sense that they were developed and maintained under the typical capacities of self-control, they would have been resisted. And when we judge agents for their weak behavior, we believe that they could and should have maintained the capacities of self-control (Watson 1977, 706). On Watson’s proposed account, the idea of weakness is like the idea of negligence when looking at the blameworthiness aspect that doesn’t necessarily require the agent to resist or that weak behavior is under control. A weak person can be viewed as negligent for not developing the relevant or “normal” capacities in exercising self-control. Watson states that an agent fails to perform and action due to a combination of reasons. They are not aware of options in which they can act, they do not want or don’t choose to do it, or they are unable to do it (Watson 1977, 708).

A possible answer as to why a person’s desire can lead them to do something other than what they judged best, according to the common account, presented by Watson, is due to weakness. A weak agent does not hold up to the standards of “reasonable and normal” self-control (Watson 1977, 704). But this still leaves a question about compulsive behavior. It is obvious that the explanation of a weak-willed individual is different from explanations in terms of compulsive desires. Under this account, a desire is considered compulsive only relative to the “capacities of the normal person,” a typical person within our society (Watson 1977, 704)

Balance of Motivation:

To best explain the balance of motivation, it would be good to go back to the biology student example presented by Mele. The agent judged that it is better to do A than to do B, all things considered, and did intend to do A right away. But he intentionally stopped when attempting to do A. Mele considers this “perplexing” (Mele 1983, 350). Mele points out that there are a multitude of explanations as to why the biology student was more motivated to not prick his finger than to prick it. A simple answer is that when the student formed the intention to prick the finger, he has more motivation to carry it out than to not do it, but as the needle is getting closer to the skin of his finger, his desire to not cause any pain to himself becomes overpowering to the point that he now has a stronger intention to not prick his finger than to prick it (Mele 1983, 350).  Another explanation as to why the biology student is more motivated to not prick his finger than to complete the assignment and prick it, is because he was not more motivated to do the latter when the intention was first formed (Mele 1983, 351).

This opens to the idea of distinguishing between two senses of ‘wants more.’ Mele presents Gary Watson’s account to showcase that there is an evaluative and motivational use of ‘wants more’ (Mele 1983, 351). In the evaluative sense, to say that the student would want X over Y is to say that the student ranks x higher than y or prefers x to y. While the motivational use, is to just say that the student is “more strongly motivated by considerations of x than by considerations of y” (Mele 1983, 351). It is important to acknowledge that wants do not bear a specific motivational power or weight. According to mele, the key regarding motivational force and what one is motivated to do lies within one’s character, more specific, their self-control or lack of (Mele 1983, 360).

Conclusion/Objection:

After presenting multiple ways one can act against their better judgment due to their desire, it can be concluded that the reasoning is due to a lack of self-control. But my argument is more complex. Let us first begin why I do not think that it is due to compulsive (irresistible) desires. Mele states that circumstances need to be considered when discussing irresistible desires, both ordinary and exceptional circumstances. Within his paper, Mele gives the example of an alcoholic who is typically able to avoid his desire to drink but cannot resist when nervous or depressed (Mele 1990, 457). Or another example a mother who cannot move a 300-pound weight at all, but after seeing her child stuck under a 400-pound timber, she is able to raise it from his body under a rush of adrenalin (Mele 1990, 457). Now, Mele does hold merit when making these assumptions, and they do count as a strong form of desire in a circumstance, but I do not think they conform into being an irresistible desire. Irresistible desires should be a desire that no matter the circumstance, whatsoever, you cannot overcome them. The alcoholic can easily resist his “irresistible” desire by seeking help from a sponsor, a family member, or practicing self-control such as when the cravings hit, he finds an alternate solution like working out. Regarding the mother an easy explanation can be stated, when she is unable to even move a 300-pound weight, that isn’t due to not having an irresistible desire a common explanation is having a lack of motivation to move it, not utilizing her strength properly, or just being lazy. Just because she successfully moved it while her child was stuck does not mean it was due to an irresistible desire, it was due to the sudden motivation and newfound strength to protect her son. An irresistible desire needs to be something that no matter the circumstance, it cannot be resisted. An example of this is a perfectionist student who has the irresistible desire to get good grades. They have this desire constantly no matter if burnt out or tired, they have a continuous desire of wanting to get good grades and do everything they can to achieve that. Mele is aiming at the right thing, but I feel his account is too broad and can count many powerful desires, that aren’t necessarily irresistible, irresistible.

Neely provides some examples within his paper that support the account of irresistible desires that I am presenting. I am holding that what many philosophers deem as irresistible are not in fact irresistible desires. Now, this is not to say they are utterly wrong, many arguments presented by Neely and Mele are in fact correct, but I do not believe their full account necessarily explains why one’s desire can lead them to do something against their better judgment. Another explanation as to why the answer would not necessarily be irresistible desires is since what can be seen as an irresistible desire can be altered. For instance, an example presented by Neely, a man has the desire to kill his father, but wishes he does not, he can go seek help by speaking to a doctor to get rid of this temptation. Or say a more extreme example a heroin addict who has the irresistible desire to constantly shoot up, they can overcome this desire through rehab and seeking medical attention. Although it is a rare occurrence considering how addictive heroin can be, it is possible. That irresistible desire will develop to just a generic desire one has, but the difference is that I can be controlled. The desire will always be there, but the solution is having a stronger self-control.

The reason why a person’s desire leads them to do something other than what they have judged best is due to a lack of self-control. Being weak willed and having a lack of control on your desires is why the agent goes against their better judgment. Like Mele points out within the biology student example, the student’s weak tendencies made him go against what he judged to be best and what he intended to do. In a sense, him being weak willed allowed for his desire to overpower him and motivated him to not prick his finger in the end. Now, Watson argues that what distinguishes a weak person to a self-controlled person is their own capacity to resist a desire. I think he is on the correct track here. A self-controlled person can resist any desire, whereas a weak person will fall under the influence of the desire. This explains why a person’s desire leads them to do an action that goes against their better judgment. It is due to weakness. Being a weak person, you are not able to control what you want to do and what action to take, you are easily influenced.  

 Mele, A. R. (1983). “Akrasia,” Reasons, and Causes. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 44(3), 345–368. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319642

Mele, A. R. (1990, January 1). Alfred R. Mele, irresistible desires. Phil Papers. Retrieved November 28, 2022, from https://philpapers.org/rec/MELID

Neely, W. (1974). Freedom and desire. The Philosophical Review, 83(1), 32. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183872

Watson, G. (1977). Skepticism about Weakness of Will. The Philosophical Review, 86(3), 316–339. https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183785